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THE ETHICAL
PATH
The True Significance of Saenz v. Roe and the
Establishment of the Right to Travel.
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One of the major “rights” that the American people take for granted is the so-called “right
to travel” which ensures equal treatment across state lines regardless of whether you are a native
of a state or a visitor. The word “travel” is not mentioned once in the Constitution. This changed
in 1999 with the case of Saenz vs. Roe, where the majority opinion plainly states that while the
right to travel is never explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, it is “firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence.”1 Saenz v. Roe is an incredibly complex case that could have been tried in quite a
few different ways. One of the primary reasons for this lies in the background of the case itself,
starting with the origins of the actual lawsuit. The plaintiff, Saenz, is a representative of three
different women who had all moved to the state of California to escape abusive household
situations from three separate states. The suit was filed because the State of California denied
[the women of the Saenz case] financial assistance provided through the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) program of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
(PRWORA) signed into law by President Clinton in 1988. This act had a clause allowing states
to decide whether or not to require any person to have lived in the state for a year or more to be
eligible for financial assistance. Saenz claimed that by electing to enforce this clause, California
was violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment.
In the forming of the majority opinion of Saenz vs. Roe, Justice Stevens focused heavily
on the right to travel as it pertained to movement between states and equal treatment, however in
this process, he paid less heed to the historical context that made enforcing the right to travel so
complex. His primary flaw is seemingly ignoring the issue of which states and entities hold
responsibility over specific needy groups given that all citizens should be treated equally across
all state lines. In trying the case on these grounds, Stevens and the other justices disregard
1

"Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)," Justia Law, accessed December 10, 2020,
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/526/489/)

2

historical contexts on the foundation of the case itself (the ability for a state to deny welfare
benefits to those considered an outsider), that would have supported the actions taken by
California. By diving into these contextual details, an analysis can be developed of how in
ignoring these contexts, Stevens was able to legally move the United States forward and
establish a new welfare responsibility for the federal government.2
I
The ability of a state to deny privileges to certain portions of the population is not a new
occurrence. In fact the practice can be traced back as far as the late 18th century in post-colonial
America. In an effort to assuage the responsibility for the poor, many states partook in the
practice known as “warning out.” Warning out was the act of shirking responsibility for
providing financial support for a group of people, commonly migrants and the poor, by not
allowing those who had been warned out to “vote, hold office, and pay taxes”3. Such legal
strangers were also ineligible for financial assistance. On a baseline level, the benefit of warning
out from the perspective of the local governments is the ability to effectively ignore any migrants
who moved into their jurisdiction and were viewed as needy or likely to become needy in the
future.
Digging even deeper into the colonial context surrounding the practice there are several
arguments that can be made to show warning out and all of the history surrounding the warning
out supporting a similar verdict to the one made by the Supreme Court. Primary among these
arguments is the reason the practice of warning out was truly established. While warning out is a
practice enforced by local governments to prevent having to shoulder the burden of supporting
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indigent migrants, the core reason behind this is not as broadly applicable as its usage would
seem. Warning out can be traced back to the Indian War of 1675, and the influx of refugees
fleeing into Massachusetts as a result of the fighting therein, thus it is reasonable to argue that
warning out is only necessary in response to surges in migration caused by conflicts such as
wars. This supports the fact that again according to Gary Nash, the number of people who were
warned out rose leading up to the Seven Years War, “... in the years just before the outbreak of
the Seven Years War --181 in 1753, 176 in 1754, and 222 in 1755”4 So given that warning out
originated from and was at its peak around times of war, there isn’t a logical thread to justify
using it to deny the ability of a poor person to move from location to location seeking better
fortunes.
The second argument supporting the Saenz v. Roe decision can be found in the legal
actions taken by the state of Massachusetts with regard to the practice of denying welfare
benefits and politically isolating the poor . While there was not a regional court case challenging
the validity of warning out, there was an act passed in 1789 that is recorded in the legal
documents of the State of Massachusetts, as documented by Morning Star, which repealed all
other acts pertaining to “the support, employment, binding, warning out, or removal of poor.”5
With this established it is extremely interesting to analyze the significance of the parallels
between “warning out” and Saenz v. Roe. At the time, warning out was an established practice
that was used frequently to the tune of “from 1721-1742... 25 persons per year” according to
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Gary Nash, however, this precedent is not something that Justice Stevens and the other justices
who tried Saenz v. Roe took into consideration when settling on the verdict. There may be a
reason for that. In fact, in his discussion of warning out in The Urban Crucible: Social Change
Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution, historian Gary Nash goes
into great depth as to the overuse of warning out and the harm that it caused. Nash explains that
it was not only certain communities that were practicing warning out during the 18th century, in
Massachusetts the practice created a type of people he deems the “strolling poor” poor people
who had left their community in search of a better life only to be kept constantly on the move
because “each community warning out migrants from neighboring communities,” ultimately
leading to heightened misfortune of those who chose to leave their homes. In a much subtler
way, this also parallels the situation that Saenz and the other plaintiffs faced, they had left their
home states seeking a better life outside of their abusive home situations, only to be warned out
from financial benefits by TANF and California. 6
II
The core question behind Saenz v. Roe, the question of who is responsible for supporting the
indigent is not exclusively applicable to migrants, in fact one of the most significant debates
surrounding this question is tied to another heated topic of post-Revolutionary America, the
abolition of slavery. Not only was there the heated debate as to the place of black people in the
new American society and the future of slavery, but even in the Northern states that had settled
to abolish slavery there was hesitance. Much of the fear that the Northern states held with
regards to abolishing slavery within their borders stems from the fact that abolishing slavery
would lead to a sudden influx of destitute black people into society, specifically the elderly
6
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Blacks. Previously, the elderly African-Americans had been the financial responsibility of the
slaveholder, if slavery were to be abolished the elderly would suddenly be the responsibility of
the state and local governments, putting more financial pressure on the governments. Therein lies
the problem, in electing to do what is an ethically good thing, the Northern states find themselves
wondering what they can do in order to determine where the responsibility lies for supporting
these newly freed slaves.
At the core of every argument about the rights of freed slaves, is the question of
citizenship; one that plays a very important role in analyzing the arguments made for and against
the abolition of slavery. An argument that can be made to counter the fear of the influx of
destitute African- Americans is that the responsibility of the states is only the responsibility to
care for the citizens of their state, and that they have no obligation to provide equal opportunity
for those who do not qualify as citizens. At the time of the abolition debates in New York, it was
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, well before the Civil War and the 13th through 15th
amendments provided insurance of birthright citizenship and equal protection. However, this is
essentially the very same argument that the state of California was making by enforcing the
citizenship requirement of the Temporary Aid for Needy Families program, by requiring that an
eligible person have lived in California for a year to qualify. California is saying that even
though one lives in the state of California and has chosen to make this state their home but,
because they don’t meet requirements the state is not entitled to do anything for them. This is a
problematic argument to make legally because one does not become an official citizen until they
reach their 18th birthday according to the USCIS naturalization fact sheet. By the same logic
states can deny children legal and financial assistance on the grounds of a child being too young
to classify as a citizen. This further complicated the debate surrounding abolition because it
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required that some provision be made to ensure freed slaves were treated as citizens even though
the Constitution did not directly make them such at the time.
There is one underlying issue with the context of abolition, one that proves Justice
Stevens' decision to move the precedent forward instead of focusing on the past. The underlying
racial bias that feeds through all of the issues with regards to abolition. While the financial
grounds previously analyzed are a logical line of thinking, there is also the issue that many white
people did not view African Americans as worthy of being given equal footing in society. In his
book Emancipating New York: The Politics of Slavery and Freedom 1777-1827, Dr. David
Gellman explores the concept that part of this inferior view of African Americans was due to
their struggles to utilize language as easily as white people did. To an affluent, educated white
man a black man speaking in broken English was not well educated enough to properly
participate in civil discourse, and, as such, should not be treated equally to the white man.
Because the white man did not make an effort to educate the black man to allow for proper
participation in society, Gellman states, “even when African- Americans appeared to measure up
to the standards of Anglo-American linguistic ability, whites degraded them for it. … ‘people
amused themselves by getting him to perform spontaneously… this seemed to me to be a cruel
and thoughtless sort of diversion.’” 7
Regardless of the fact that racism still exists in America, it had been legally abolished
well before 1999, when the Saenz case was heard. The 13th and 14th amendments formally
ended slavery in the late 19th century. In the mid-late 20th century the Civil Rights act finally
ruled that African- Americans are entitled to the same legal treatment as any other American. It
is the “privileges and immunities” clause of the 14th amendment, which states “the citizens of
7
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each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of several states,” upon which Justice
Stevens based his argument in Saenz v. Roe. This, partnered with the establishment of birthright
citizenship, that anyone born in the United States is a citizen of the United States, meant that in
trying the Saenz case any decision that Stevens made could be broadly extended to determining
the breadth of the “right to travel.” Thus if Stevens elected to consider the history surrounding
abolition and the financial burden of the impoverished African-Americans, which was
established to have been partially based in racism and racial biases, into his decision he would be
validating the opinion that African-Americans were unworthy of treatment equal to that of other
citizens. Instead of honoring this, Stevens, whether knowingly or not, recognized that American
society of 1999 was not the same as the post- colonial American society which was clearly more
explicitly racist. By focusing on codifying the “right to travel” something previously only
implied by the wording of the privileges and immunities clause, he expanded the duties of the
states to caring for all people, regardless of race or wealth.
III
The most surprising pieces of history to exclude from the Saenz decision was the struggle
of the women of post-Colonial America. This is a two pronged issue. The first pertaining to the
treatment of mothers. As was previously discussed, issues with welfare are connected to the
impacts of war and conflict on those in the countries involved in conflict. In post-Colonial
America, due to the extremely limited definition of who was considered a citizen of the United
States, women as well as the previously discussed African-Americans were left out of that
definition. This was highly problematic because with their husbands fighting in the war, women
were required to provide for their families, but as they were not considered citizens, they were
not entitled to the welfare benefits provided by the state and federal governments. In Ebb Tide in
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New England: women, seaports, and social change, historian Elaine Foreman-Crane makes the
important point that, while women at this time were able to work jobs and provide for their
families, they were subject to the “time constraints of wives and mothers. Women far more often
than men earned income on an irregular and seasonal basis.” Without the benefits of welfare, this
left many women whose significant others fought in the war in an extremely vulnerable financial
position.8
It was not only the married women who were impacted by the lack of welfare benefits, it
was also the widowed. A side effect of not being considered citizens was the fact that women
were not allowed to participate in political discourse, and women were also not allowed to hold
land. The law did allow for widows to inherit the financial capital of their late husbands and for
them to work a job, but it was also extremely common for women to become financially
dependent upon their husbands. Thus with the deaths of their husbands many widows are left
with only their inherited funds and limited access to job opportunities which would make it
difficult forthem to provide for themselves. Even worse, in 1692 a law was passed that made it
where widows could no longer easily flip their estates in order to game the financial cushion
necessary to properly care for their families, as well as requiring that the debts of their husbands
be taken off of the top of their inheritances, Foreman-Crane writes “the 1692 law… enhanced
creditors rights at the expense of the widows...debts came off the top... “9 The question then
became, if the law is making it more difficult for widows to stay financially afloat, and women
are not considered citizens, who is responsible for the welfare of these disenfranchised women?
The clear answer seemed to be that the women were left responsible for their own fates.
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Justice Stevens thought differently in his opinion in Saenz v. Roe. Though he does not
explicitly mention the struggles of women in the late-18th century, the interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause within his majority opinion turns this history on its head. In
establishing that the “right to travel” is a right guaranteed to all citizens of the United States,
Stevens established that it was the responsibility of the states to provide for their citizens as well
as the citizens of other states who may be visiting. Thus the establishment of the “right to travel”
makes laws such as the 1692 act difficult to enforce as now the states have become required to
provide for the widows and other women who, because of birthright citizenship, are considered
citizens. Stevens, trying the case in 1999, realized that the United States was no longer a county
where only white, property holding men were considered citizens. Seeing this he tried the case
on grounds that it would do the greatest good for the most people and moved the United States
forward with that decision, closer to the country where all men, and women, are created equal.
IV
There is a very distinct bent to the ruling in Saenz v. Roe. Justice Stevens’ decision is at
its core an ethical argument, not a legal one.. The one major group of court cases cited was the
Slaughterhouse Cases. According to historian Eric Foner, the court's decision in these cases
established that the Privileges and Immunities Clause applied to “only those rights that derived
from national, not state citizenship.”10 The broad applicability of this precedent was merely in
allowing for the courts to establish the fact that they have the right to rule on the Privileges and
Immunities clause. One of the interesting pieces to realize with this is that the lack of extreme
reliance on precedent means that, in fact, Justice Stevens was relying heavily on ethics to
reinforce his argument. The ethical concept behind Stevens' argument is twofold: 1) that it is the
10
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responsibility of the fortunate/ the powerful to look after the less fortunate; 2) the United States
is a unified whole, not just fifty individual states. The first point is reminiscent of the famous
“Model of Christian Charity” speech by John Winthrop, in which he said “that every man might
have need of others, and from hence they might be all knit more nearly together in the bonds of
brotherly affection.”11 The implication of this being that all men hold a responsibility to care for
their fellow man as they are reliant on one another to survive, and the ethics that underlie that
argument and the glue that binds together Justice Stevens' argument in Saenz v. Roe. Stevens
recognized that the actions of California undermined the principle of the powerful caring for the
powerless, as did all of the history previously discussed throughout the course of this paper, and
in this recognition made a decision that above all ensured that all people regardless of where they
lived, there race, gender, or creed would be able to live without fear of having necessary welfare
denied them
The ideological core of the Stevens’ ethical argument established the emotional core is t
that the United States is to quote the Pledge of Allegiance “one nation under God” and that with
any one state given the power to deny privileges to that should be provided by the Constitution, it
shows a lack of unity within United States that could lead to unrest among the states.
Acknowledging this risk, Stevens laid heavy emphasis on how the freedom of movement
between states promoted by the “right to travel” made the country seem more unified and whole
reinforcing the social and economic interdependence of the United States, which wraps back to
the Slaughterhouse cases and the ultimate decision that national citizens were entitled to the
same treatment of every state. This is something that has long been believed to be guaranteed to
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the people of the United States, but was not established until Justice Stevens made the decision
to rule that even though the word “travel” is never mentioned in the Constitution it is in fact
“firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.”

On the surface, Saenz v. Roe is not an exceedingly difficult case to understand. At the
time the case was being tried, it was only mentioned in passing in the press, the New York Times
article on it being found on page 18. However, even then the Times, like myself, realized the
great future significance that the case could hold stating “the debate today was over welfare
policy...but the deeper issue was the meaning of citizenship.12” Prior to my research, the most
intriguing piece of this case to me was the fact that I did not know that it wasn’t until 1999 that
my equal treatment across state lines was guaranteed. I sought to discover the reason something
so ingrained in the culture of the United States had taken so long to become incorporated. I
quickly discovered the fact that this was not the most significant piece of the puzzle as to the
lasting impact of Saenz v. Roe. The reason the “right to travel” was not incorporated for so long
is primarily due the fact that it does not exist constitutionally. It exists in a gray area, in between
the enumerated rights clearly outlined in the Constitution and those implied rights that weren’t
explicitly mentioned but were clearly derived from the Constitution and its amendments, unlike
these other rights the “right to travel” is not clearly developed by the Constitution. Legally this
makes it extremely difficult to try at the level of the Supreme Court because their responsibility
is to try all cases on the grounds of Constitutionality, and with no grounds in the Constitution the
right becomes difficult to incorporate.
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I came to the realization that the real intrigue in this case came not from the facts that
were included, but from those that were not. In digging into the history of the case, and some of
the precedents that were not acknowledged in the majority opinion. As I found more and more
history, I found out exactly why Stevens wrote the majority opinion as he did. Saenz v. Roe, and
more broadly the right to travel was a case that involved each and every aspect of the 14th
amendment. The 14th amendment provides birthright citizenship, anyone born in the USA is a
citizen of the USA. This is on trial in Saenz v. Roe because California was trying to treat the
plaintiffs differently from other citizens. The 14th amendment also guarantees that all citizens
are treated equally all throughout the United States, at trial in the Saenz case for the same reason.
Stevens was therefore able to try the case on the grounds of welfare and the Privileges and
Immunities clause, while using the grounds of the 14th amendment to establish the right to
travel. Without histories such as those I discussed in this essay, the “right to travel” would have
remained in quotations never seen as something that needed to be put into law. The existence of
histories that show unequal treatment of people in need of assistance, coupled with the
circumstances of Saenz v. Roe, and a justice seeking to make a difference allowed for the “right
to travel” becoming the right to travel.
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